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Abortion in Israel: 
Community, Rights, and 
the Context of Compromise 
. 
Noga Morag Levine 
In contrast to American understandings of abortion as a uniquely tragic 
dilemma, the Israeli abortion issue is a tangential controversy in a larger 
debate over the relationship between the state's national and democratic iden, 
tity. The divergent paths of abortion politics in Israel and the United States 
reflect important differences in underlying religious doctrines, geographical 
size, feminist ideologies, and the immediacy of other social cleavages. More 
profoundly, the two abortion stories are the product of distinct understand, 
ings of the mutual obligations between citizens and their state and of the 
relationship between individual and collective rights and duties. While these 
differences may account for the capacity of Israeli activists on both sides to 
forge pragmatic compromises, the stability of these policies is uncertain both 
because of changing Israeli priorities and the import of American conceptions 
of the abortion dispute. 
The strategic and moral desirability of abortion compromises is a cur, 
rent and contested question among activists on both sides of the American 
abortion divide. The deepening scars inflicted by this controversy on Amer, 
ican public life have prompted a search for rhetoric and policy formulas that 
would defuse the "clash of absolutes" and allow opposing sides to split the 
difference.1 At least in part, this search has been inspired by the relative 
Noga Morag Levine is a Ph.D. candidate in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, 
University of California at Berkeley. The author wishes to thank Orit Kamir and two 
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and Tamar Marag, Penina Morag-Talmon, and 
Dori Pinto for crucial assistance in gathering materials. An earlier version was presented at 
the 1993 annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago. 
1. The term "clash of absolutes" is taken from Lawrence Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of 
Absolutes (New York: Norton, 1990) ("Tribe, Abortion"). Tribe's specific compromise proposal 
focuses on greater social attention to pregnancy prevention and the availability of contracep-
tives. Others have emphasized the need for dialogue and empathy toward the positions of 
© 1994 American Bar Foundation. 
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calm of abortion politics elsewhere and a growing sense that domestic incar, 
nations of this dispute may not be inevitable. 
An important contribution to this debate and to the comparative 
search for alternatives has been Mary Ann Glendon's study of the legal 
norms governing abortion in 20 Western countries.2 Glendon found Ameri, 
can legal and political responses to abortion exceptional and extreme and 
attributed this uniqueness to the impact of individualism and rights dis, 
course in the United States. She suggested that the constitutionalization of 
the abortion dispute has prematurely cut the social debate and argued that 
state legislatures, rather than the Supreme Court, are the appropriate forum 
for the normative accommodation that abortion demands. This call has re, 
cently been echoed by Roger Rosenblatt,3 who endorsed both Glendon's 
American exceptionalism thesis and her advocacy of a legislative middle 
ground patterned after European abortion statutes. 
The pertinence of foreign compromises to the American abortion dis, 
pute has been debated on both substantive and methodological grounds. 
While some readers questioned the normative coherence and political feasi, 
bility of the statutory solutions Glendon envisions,4 others pointed to the 
limited data she consulted and the absence of social science and social con' 
text from her research. These methodological objections related both to the 
both sides; see, e.g., Ruth Colker, "Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Com-
passion, and Wisdom," 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1011 (1989); and Faye D. Ginsburg, Contested Uves: 
The Abortion Debate in an American Community (Berkeley: Universiry of California Press, 
1989). In the United States activists on both sides of the issue are deeply divided over the 
wisdom and legitimacy of compromise. The Christian Action Council has abandoned its boy-
cott of corporate sponsors of planned parenthood in favor of an extensive network of "crisis 
pregnancy centers." In response to this and other compromise moves, RandaU Terry, the 
founder of Operation Rescue, has stated that the days in which leaders from different (anti-
abortion) factions were gracious to one another are over: "We're taking the gloves off. We are 
not going to tolerate cowardice and compromise in our camp .... We want to change the face 
and (most important) principles of the pro-life movement-God is, and he has spoken." Lynn 
Smith, "Bowed but Unbroken?" Los Angeles Times, 22 March 1993, p. EI. Similar divisions are 
curtently apparent in the pro-choice movement, primarily with regard to the Freedom of 
Choice Act and the nature of the concessions necessary for its passage. See, e.g., Robin Toner, 
"Success Spoils Uniry of Abortion Rights Groups," N.Y. Times, 20 April 1993, p. A16. 
2. Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and DivOTce in Western Law (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versiry Press, 1987) ("Glendon, Abortion and DivOTce"). 
3. Roger Rosenblatt, Ufe Itself: Abortion in the American Mind (New York: Random 
House, 1993). 
4. Lawrence Tribe has warned against the incompatibiliry between Glendon's solutions 
and fundamental American values and warned against the "unacceptably high toU" her ap-
proach would exact "on confidence in the rule of law and in the integriry of the legal system 
as a whole." Tribe, Abortion 73-74. Richard Epstein questioned the normative foundations of 
Glendon's approach and argued that her effort at compromise lacks logical coherence. Rich-
ard Epstein, Book Review: "Rights and 'Rights Talk,'" 105 HaT\!. L. Rev. 1106, 1121 (1992). 
Arguments against the political feasibiliry of Glendon's model have focused on the improba-
biliry of abortion compromises under the anti-abortion tendencies of many state legislatures; 
Jane Maslow Cohen, Review Essay: "Comparison-Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights," 98 
Yale L.]. 1235, 1253 (1989). On the irrelevance of Glendon's compromise proposals to the 
concerns of those who care most deeply about abortion, see Sylvia A. Law, "Abortion Com-
promise-Inevitable and Impossible," 1992 U. IU. L. Rev. 921, 938-39. 
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accuracy and completeness of the European stories themselvess and to their 
relevance to American abortion dilemmas. Comparative abortion prescrip' 
tions, suggested Martha Fineman in a review of Glendon's book, can be 
persuasive only when they account for differences in the political culture, 
religious beliefs, and feminist discourse in which foreign abortion models are 
situated. Fineman argued that where such serious attention to context is 
missing, there is little evidence for the proposition that "European solutions 
can be transplanted and their stories translated for Americans."6 
This article aims to apply such contextual analysis to the evolution of 
abortion compromises in Israel. Although Israel was not one of the coun, 
tries included in Glendon's study, the legislative solutions that country 
adopted are like those she espouses. While important religious and geopolit, 
ical factors distinguish the Israeli case from others Glendon considered, 
these same factors also highlight the potential for fundamental differences 
in the local meaning of abortion controversies. Such differences do not in, 
validate the search for better alternatives, but they should caution us against 
comparative explorations that ignore the complex interactions between law, 
culture, and the manifestation of social conflict. 
I. DEMOCRACY, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND 
ABORTION 
Abortion is hardly the first topic to capture the attention of observers 
of Israeli politics. Although conflicts over abortion legislation have periodi, 
cally resurfaced in the country, the subject has largely remained tangential 
to the Israeli public debate and the multiple social cleavages that cut across 
this society.7 Most often, abortion has entered Israeli politics in the context 
of coalition demands by orthodox parties that have included abortion re, 
strictions among conditions for their support of various Israeli governments. 
In response to the threat of such legislation, opposing groups have mobilized 
with varying success. The result has been episodic and intermittent public 
attention to an issue that for the most part seems to elicit more apathy than 
ambivalence. 
The multiplicity and intensity of other political conflicts in Israel offers 
a partial explanation for the relative marginality of abortion issues. Never, 
5. See Heleen F. P. Ietswaan, Book Review: "Incomplete Stories," 69 Boston U.L. Rev. 
257 (1989), and Leslie Pickering Francis, Book Review: "Virtue and the American Family," 
102 Haw. L. Rev. 469 (1988), for the argument that Glendon's account of the Dutch, Ger-
man, and French models are inaccurate on several grounds. 
6. Martha L. Fineman, "Contexts and Comparisons," 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1431, 1433 
(1988). 
7. For an analysis of these cleavages and cunent competing pressures in Israeli society, 
see Dan Horowitz & Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1989) ("Horowitz & Lissak, Trouble in Utopia"). 
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theless, because of the centrality of both religious values and population 
policies to Israeli political life, the abortion debate's low profile may seem 
perplexing. Israeli national identity is founded on a precarious balance be, 
tween the country's dual definition as a Jewish and a democratic state, and 
abortion policy touches on both sides of this equation. While the legal sta, 
tus of abortion is inherently tied to the unresolved debate over the role of 
religious Jewish law in Israeli life, the demographic implications of abortion 
policies are relevant to the reliance of the Jewish and democratic formula 
on the maintenance of a popular Jewish majority. 
The puzzle created by the failure of these considerations to transform 
abortion into a central social dispute is compounded by the attention 
granted to other religious concerns. Issues such as the operation of movie 
theaters or public transportation on the Sabbath or the paving of a road 
over what may have been an ancient Jewish cemetery have repeatedly been 
the subject of large and often angry demonstrations. Motorists who venture 
on Saturday into religious neighborhoods have occasionally been stoned, 
and the windows of a Jerusalem restaurant that served bread on Passover 
were shattered. While abortion has not been ignored by religious interests 
in Israel, and disputes relating to its regulation do occasionally flare, the 
issue has not drawn the sustained attention and political efforts of these 
other, arguably less difficult, religion and state conflicts. 
The courts, including the increasingly active Supreme Court, have had 
little to say on the abortion question and have never considered the legiti, 
macy of governmental intervention in this sphere. The scarcity of abortion' 
related adjudication can be attributed partly to the absence of a written 
constitution and judicial review empowered to invalidate legislative acts. 
Although the Israeli Supreme Court has increasingly invoked doctrines of 
fundamental values in its statutory and regulatory interpretations, the "con' 
stitutional common law" that evolved out of this process is devoid of a con' 
ception of inherent limits on state power.s The absence of such a 
constitutional anchor makes the central jurisprudential questions of the 
American abortion debate largely irrelevant to Israeli politics.9 But it does 
8. The term "constitutional common law" is taken from Amos Shapira, "The Israeli 
Supreme Court and Human Rights," in Daniel Elazar, ed., Constitutionalism: The Israeli and 
American Experiences (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990). 
9. Much of this area is currently in flux. In 1992 the Israeli Knesset enacted Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Freedom, 1391 S.H. 150 (1992) (in Hebrew). The law provides that no 
person's life, body, dignity or property shall be violated and includes, among other guarantees, 
protections for private domains and personal communications. Under the law such guarantees 
can be infringed "only by a law that conforms to the values of the State of Israel-which is a 
Jewish and democratic state-is directed to a worthy purpose, and only to the extent neces-
sary." See David Kretzmer, "The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in 
Israeli Constitutional Law?" 26 Is. L. Rev. 238, 242, 248, for the argument that the new law 
allows for some forms of judicial review. Justice Aharon Barak, the current Deputy Chief 
Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, off the bench has described the new law as a "constitu-
tional revolution" and a new framework for the invalidation of some Knesset laws. Aharon 
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not explain why in contrast to prevailing tendencies to involve the highly 
accessible Supreme Court in multiple spheres of public life,IO Israelis have 
rarely called for judicial interventions in abortion. Instead, a set of de facto 
compromises has allowed for a tentative regulatory regime that has largely 
defused the abortion conflict. The ideological and political factors that sus~ 
tain this compromise and that distinguish Israeli abortion politics from their 
American counterpart are developed below. 
II. IDEOLOGIES AND ACTORS 
A. Abortion in Jewish Religious Law 
While religious doctrines are almost always intertwined with the evolu~ 
tion of abortion politics, Jewish abortion doctrines bear particular relevance 
to Israeli abortion controversies because of the complicated and unresolved 
relationship between religious and state law in that country. In the absence 
of constitutional boundary demarcations, a set of ad hoc solutions and de~ 
ferred decisions have defined the search for mediation between Jewish and 
democratic values.ll While in certain areas, most notably marriage and di~ 
vorce, religious norms were officially incorporated by state law, much of this 
sphere remains governed by extralegal solutions. The avoidance of law has 
served to defuse potential conflicts between the religious and secular sys~ 
terns. But it has also resulted in little political accountability and pervasive 
gaps between explicit and implicit religion and state policies. 
Jewish attitudes toward abortion are nuanced and open to conflicting 
interpretations. Jewish abortion norms derive from Biblical and Talmudic 
texts that address the question only indirectly.12 Vague and at times incon~ 
sistent, these sources have become the basis of a religious doctrine charac~ 
terized by significant divisions over the nature, scope, and origin of the 
prohibition on abortion. What unites these diverse views and distinguishes 
Barak, "The Supreme Court's Weighty Task" Jerusalem Post, 24 May 1992. The Israeli 
Supreme Court is yet to rule on this question. 
10. The Isroeli Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, exercises original juris-
diction over petitions against governmental and administrative actions. 
11. Horowitz & Lissak, Trouble in Utopia. 
12. The primary paradigm case and the sole biblical reference in this context is Exodus 
21:22-23. The passage describes a situation in which a pregnant woman is accidentally in-
jured as a result of a fight between two men. The text distinguishes between a situation in 
which no catastrophe occurs and the man is assessed a fine and one in which a catastrophe 
does occur and life is given for life. Rabbinic interpretations have viewed "catastrophe" as 
harm to the mother and thus concluded that the damage to the fetus was a civil and not a 
criminal wrong. Talmudic and Rabbinical discussions offer examples relating to a fetus who 
endangers a woman's life during childbirth, a pregnant woman who is to be executed, and the 
legal capacity of a fetus to receive gifts and acquire property. See Dena S. Davis, "Abortion in 
Jewish Thought: A Study in Casuistry," 60 (2) J. Am. Acad. Religion 313 (1992), and David 
Kramer, "Jewish Ethics and Abortion," 8 (1) Tikkun 55 (1993). 
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the Jewish position from its Catholic counterpart is the clear precedence 
accorded to maternal life over the life of the fetus. Questions of ensoulment 
or salvation after death are not relevant to Jewish theology in this area, and 
the inferior life claim of the fetus is reflected in a religious requirement that 
abortions be performed to save the life of the mother.B 
In contrast to the unbending divisions imposed by equating abortion to 
murder, Jewish debates of the issue revolve around the flexible distinction 
between necessary and unnecessary abortions. While some rabbis would jus' 
tify abortions only when the woman's life is in danger, others are willing to 
extend religious exemptions when continuation of the pregnancy threatens 
the woman's physical or psychological well being. Although these differ, 
ences can have crucial practical implications ~d are grounded in divergent 
views of the gravity of abortion, they represent points along a continuum 
defined by contextual understandings of religious duties in this sphere.14 
The supremacy of maternal life in Jewish religious law has fractured the 
alliance U.S. Orthodox Jewish organizations have had with the anti,abor, 
tion movement and has led to expressions of ambivalence over the absolu, 
tist ideology of anti,abortion forces. IS Similar sentiments have allowed for 
legislative compromises in the Israeli context that largely fit within the 
case,by,case approach implied by Jewish law. Although the terms and im, 
plementation of the statutory exemption categories continue to be targets of 
religious unrest, there is little in the underlying theology that evokes the 
fervor and commitment of the American anti,abortion movement.16 
13. The supremacy of matemallife to that of the fetus continues until the fetus's head or 
major body part has emerged. After the emergence of the head. the fetus assumes human 
status in most respects. See Immanuel Jakobovits, Jewish Medical Ethics (New York: Philosoph-
ical Library, 1959). 
14. See David M. Feldman, Birth Control in Jewish Law (New York: New York University 
Press, 1968). 
15. Speaking to this issue. Rabbi Pinhas Stolper, executive director of the Union of 
Orthodox Jewish Congregations. stated in 1989: "We do not identify with those groups that 
feel all abortion is murder .... Unlike the Catholic position ... Halacha Dewish law] takes 
different views of the fetus at different times of development. In the Jewish view, the supreme 
need is to consider the life, health and well being of the mother." Walter Ruby, "The Organ-
ized American Jewish Community Takes a 'Freedom of Choice' Line on Abortion," Jerusalem 
Post, 14 March 1989, p. 7. Similar sentiments were expressed by Agudath Israel of America, 
an ultra Orthodox lobbying group which filed an anti-abortion brief in Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), when it refused to support a bill that would have 
excluded religiously mandated abortion ftom religious fteedoms protected under another pro-
posed federal statute ftom state encroachment. "Agudath Israel Objects to Religious Freedom 
Act," Jewish Advocate, 28 Feb. 1992, at 6. 
16. A 1974 report issued by a committee which drafted revisions to the Israeli abortion 
code included two rabbinical opinions on the Jewish status of abortion. Both opinions link 
the permissibility of abortion to the age and circumstances of the pregnancy, and both suggest 
a disapproving yet flexible attitude. Report of the Committee for the Study of the Ban on 
Induced Abortions, 17 (4) Briyut Hatsibur 425, 495-505 (1974) ("Committee Report, Briyut 
Hatsibur") (in Hebrew). 
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B. Ideological Commitments and Anti,Abortion Activism 
If Israelis are divided over the religious content of their identity, the 
need for a Jewish majority in the state is widely accepted by its Jewish citi~ 
zens. Such a majority is considered to be the linchpin in the state's Jewish 
democratic balance and is at the heart of Israeli struggles over the future of 
the occupied territories. While the spectrum of Israeli politics is defined by 
alternative emphasis on particularistic and universal values, the respective 
visions of both sides depend on the stability of a Jewish popular majority. 
Although there is little consensus on the impact demographic problems 
ought to have on national abortion policies, the argument from demogra~ 
phy, in contrast to the argument from religion, has broad social resonance. 
The result has been an anti~abortion coalition that has chosen to emphasize 
collective national values and in which the religious affiliation and motiva~ 
tion of many of its activists have been largely suppressed. 
The primary anti~abortion voice in Israel has been Efrat-the Right to 
Life Association for the Encouragement of Increase of Birthrate among the 
Jewish People. Efrat was incorporated in 1962 in response to statistical evi~ 
dence shOWing declining Jewish birth rates in the country, limited immigra~ 
tion, and differential fertility of Arabs and Jews. During the 1960s the 
organization's primary focus was on the creation of a normative social cli~ 
mate that would emphasize the "national obligation to care for the future of 
the people and its numeric strength" and the creation of social policies that 
would encourage and reward large families.l7 The first Efrat newsletter, pub~ 
lished in 1962, made only implicit reference to abortion and did not list it 
among the organizational goals and bylaws cited in that issue. The subject 
was directly addressed for the first time in a 1965 newsletter that detailed 
Efrat's role in pressuring the Attorney General toward stricter enforcement 
of the abortion law and marked the beginning of growing organizational 
emphasis on abortion policies. 
This process culminated in the early 1980s with a pronounced shift in 
the rhetorical style employed by the organization. It was during that time 
that the words "Right to Life" were added to Efrat's official title, and its 
newsletter began to emphasize fetal rights by using medical textbook pic~ 
tures of abortion and publishing articles like "Four Ways to Kill an Unborn 
Child" and the "Diary of an Unborn Child."18 The American anti~abortion 
movement was quite clearly the inspiration for this change, whose conduit 
appears to have been American Orthodox immigrants who became in~ 
17. See Efrat, November 1962, p. 4 (in Hebrew). The cover of this newsletter features a 
picture of a couple with their ten children. The caption reads "Happiness and Strength in the 
home of the Tawik family. May everyone be like them." 
18. 12 Yedion-A Quarterly for Family Affairs and the Encouragement of Procreation among 
the Jewish People (translated title), pp. 24-25 (1983) ("Yedion") (in Hebrew). The publication 
is an Efrat newsletter. 
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volved in Israeli abortion politics during that time.19 Clear reference to the 
American inspiration was made in a 1985 Efrat newsletter which cited the 
American anti~abortion movement as a model for imitation and which fea~ 
tured a picture of Ronald Reagan on its cover. The new emphasis on fetal 
rights may also have been the product of recognition of the growing individ~ 
ualism in Israeli society and the limited impact of demographic exhortations 
on parenthood decisions. Appeals that during the 1960s were couched in 
the language of national obligation and collective responsibilities were 
transformed in the 1980s into moral claims about fetal life. In both cases 
there was little if any reference to religious values or Jewish law. 
The absence of religious rhetoric in Efrat's campaign is in part a prod~ 
uct of a tactical choice designed to insulate the abortion debate from the 
antireligious animosities of many secular Israelis. Speaking directly to this 
issue, an editorial in a 1984 Efrat newsletter stated: "We should develop 
ideas and present facts before the general public. We should not use reli~ 
gious arguments in front of them. There are plenty of philosophical, moral, 
demographic and health reasons to oppose abortion .... Religious justifica~ 
tions may lead the secular public to think that this is just another religious 
observance."2o But the diversity of arguments Efrat advanced in its anti~ 
abortion campaign was more than a facade for a hidden, exclusively reli~ 
gious agenda. It reflected the varied positions of those who assembled in its 
coalition, the frequent alliance between nationalist and religious interests in 
Israel, and the less than homogenous view of Jewish religious law on this 
subject. The result was an anti-abortion campaign that focused on "unnec~ 
essary abortions" and, in contrast to its corollary American movement, was 
not propelled by one overarching claim. While the multiplicity of argu~ 
ments advanced by Efrat helped it win support in broad quarters, it has also 
defused the intensity of the debate and bypassed the dichotomous divisions 
that have characterized the American abortion struggle. 
An even more pronounced retreat from ideological confrontation is 
evident in the philosophical direction adopted by Just One Life, a private 
organization established in 1986 with the goal of offering social and finan~ 
cial assistance to pregnant women. Unlike Efrat, Just One Life opposes legis~ 
lative restrictions on abortion and its activists emphasize the centrality of a 
woman's choice to decisions in this sphere.21 
19. One such immigrant, a statistician named Haim Hazan was appointed under pressure 
by Agudat Israel, an ultra orthodox political party, as special abortions consultant to the 
Minister of Health during the early 1980s. 
20. Shlomo·Yona Tuaf, "Religious Justifications Ought Not Be Used in Front of the 
General Public" (translated title), 17-18 Yedion 3 (1984) (in Hebrew). 
21. Susan Poizner, "The Abortion Debate Goes On," Contact (Jerusalem Post Magazine), 
12 July 1991, and Carl Alpert, "Israel Has Abortion Problems Too," Greater Phoenix Jewish 
News, 31 Jan. 1992, p. 8. 
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C. Ideological Commitments and Abortion Services Activism 
A similar diversity in organizational structure, tactics, and ideology ex~ 
ists on the opposite side of the Israeli abortion question.22 Among those 
active on behalf of abortion rights and abortion services are the Social 
Workers Union, mainstream women's organizations, the Israeli Planned 
Parenthood Association, the Association for Civil Rights, pregnancy coun~ 
seling centers, and the Israeli feminist movement. The bulk of these groups' 
efforts have centered on protection of the current legal status quo and the 
provision of information and support services required for successful maneu~ 
vering of the obstacles it poses. Few claims are grounded in reproductive 
freedoms and a right to choose and liberal arguments have focused on the 
terms of governmental intervention in abortion, not on the basic legitimacy 
of such regulation. The result has been an abortion services movement 
largely devoid of rights discourse and characterized by a significant amount 
of sympathy for the demographic concerns of the other sideP 
The practical absence of a reproductive choice agenda in the Israeli 
abortion debate reflects the general marginality of the Israeli feminist move~ 
ment. Originally organized as a political group in the late 1970s by Ameri~ 
can immigrants, this movement has struggled to gain a foothold in Israeli 
politics and its language and concerns remain foreign to most Israeli wo~ 
men. Although recent years have shown the formation of an increasingly 
vocal women's lobby and growing feminist consciousness on the part of 
traditional women's groups, activists in these organizations repeatedly la~ 
ment the difficulties they encounter in mobilizing support among women. 
This political passivity is the product of multiple factors ranging from the 
influence of traditional Middle Eastern cultures to the effects of military life 
and values on the place and self~perception of women in society. But it is 
also the product of the overwhelming impact of the fundamental dispute 
over the goals and terms of Israeli~ Palestinian relations and the willingness 
of women on both sides of this divide to defer gender~equity issues to a later 
date.24 Even if the improving prospects for peace in the Middle East were to 
result in greater emphasis on gender equality, such efforts would not begin 
with abortion. Israeli family law, which delegates almost all marriage and 
22. Delila Amir & D. Navon, The Politics of Abortion in Israel (translated title) 50 (Tel 
Aviv: Pinchas Sapir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, 1989) ("Amir & Navon, 
Politics of Abortion") (in Hebrew). 
23. Id. at 17-37. 
24. Both the magnitude of alternative cleavages and the marginality of gender to the 
political identity of Israeli women were clearly reflected in the political fortunes of a party 
that ran on an exclusive women's rights platform during the 1992 general elections. The Party 
received a total of 2,886 votes, or 0.1 % of the total votes cast, an electoral result that placed it 
just below a party that promoted the professional interests of taxi drivers and far short of the 
39,253 votes necessary for representation in the current Knesset. Asher Wallfish, "Final Elec-
tion Vote Tally Marginally Adjusted," Jerusalem Post, 29 June 1992, p. 3. 
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divorce questions to the religious courts, is notoriously unfair to women who 
depend on their husbands' consent for divorce.25 This and other personal 
status questions, rather than abortions, would be the most likely targets of 
gender~based mobilization in Israel. 
As is evident from the above picture, the Israeli abortion debate can be 
characterized by the absence of a strong ideological component in both 
sides. In contrast to the gulf that separates pro~choice and anti~abortion 
activists in the United States, the spectrum of disagreement in Israel is sig~ 
nificantly narrower. Calls for absolute prohibitions on abortion or abortion 
on demand are virtually absent, and political struggles have largely focused 
on attempts to restrict "unnecessary abortions" or campaigns to enlarge the 
range of legal circumstances under which abortion ought to be permitted. 
To this extent, abortion in Israel seems to accord with the conciliatory pat~ 
tern and compromise solutions Glendon ascribed to European abortion poli~ 
tics.26 The following section presents an analysis of the origins and terms of 
this compromise. 
III. LEGISLATIVE BATTLES AND INFORMAL 
COMPROMISE 
Official Israeli abortion statistics show an average of 15,427 annual 
abortions or a rate of between 15 and 20 per thousand women of childbear~ 
ing age.27 In addition, private, illegal abortions are provided by physicians in 
clinics. There is no reliable data on the frequency of such private abortions, 
but 5,000-6,000 are commonly quoted figures.28 The significance of the dis~ 
tinction between legal and illegal abortions and the evolution of legislative 
compromises in this area are discussed below. 
A. The Old Abortion Statute and the Impetus for Reform 
In accordance with cross~national trends toward abortion law reform 
during the 1970s, Israeli abortion statutes were amended in 1977. However, 
25. Under Jewish law, divorce depends on the consent of both parties. However, reli-
gious sanctions against extramarital relations drastically discriminate against married women. 
As a result, women are significantly disadvantaged by the mutual consent requirement. 
26. Glendon, Abortion and Divorce (cited in note 2). 
27. Between 1979 and 1990, the lowest number of recorded hospital abortions was in 
1981 (14,514) and the highest in 1982 (16,829). Latest available statistics are for 1991 and 
show a total of 15,509 hospital abortions. Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 42, sec. 3.21 (1991). 
28. Lotte Salzberger, Sarah Magidor, Amy Avgar, & Janet Baumgold-Land, "Patterns of 
Contraceptive Behavior Among Jerusalem Women Seeking Pregnancy Counselling 
1980-1989" at 14 (Hebrew UnivetSity of Jerusalem, Paul Baetwald School of Social Work 
1991). ("Salzberger et al. 'Patterns of Contraceptive Behavior' "). Although instances of medi-
cal malpractice in the private abortion area have been the object of significant media atten-
tion, most private abortions are performed in safe and professional medical settings. Id. at 15. 
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in contrast to the impetus for most such reforms during that era, significant 
support for the new Israeli legislation came from those who wanted to re~ 
strict rather than liberalize the availability of abortions. The reform effort 
was largely propelled by a search for greater governmental commitment to 
abortion law enforcement and frustration with the total irrelevance of what 
was until then a categorical legal ban on abortions.29 
Israel's first abortion statute originated in British mandatory legislation 
and was adopted together with most of the mandatory criminal code when 
the state became independent in 1948. The law criminalized the perform~ 
ance of all abortions, with the exception of the judicially recognized defense 
of medical necessity. Rarely enforced during the British mandate, the law 
remained a dead letter under its Israeli incarnation.3D Between 1952 and 
1963 this de facto nonenforcement policy was strengthened by Attorney 
General directives that limited prosecution to abortions in which the wo~ 
man's consent was in doubt or where negligence or injury were involved. 
These directives were rescinded in 1963 when their legality was contested 
in early attempts to restrict the availability of abortions. Despite this change 
and temporary expectations of a clamp down on abortion providers,31 the 
law continued to be ignored, and the private abortion market flourished. In 
addition, de facto abortion approval procedures were implemented by the 
largest labor union sick fund, which performed and often funded the abor~ 
tions it approved.32 
The first call for institutionalization of the ad hoc procedures appeared 
in the 1966 report of a Commission for the Study of Birthrate Problems, 
appointed in response to growing concerns over declining population 
growth and the differential fertility of Arabs and Jews. The commission 
cited abortions among the factors contributing to the nation's declining 
birth rates, but its members failed to agree on the policy implications of this 
finding. While four of the eight~member commission opposed greater state 
intervention in abortion, the remainder called for statutory reform aimed at 
creating more realistic and enforceable legal norms. The primary strategy 
they promoted was legalization of the semiofficial arrangements, most nota~ 
bly hospital abortion approval committees.33 Such a step, argued the com~ 
mission's majority report, would reintroduce a measure of governmental 
control into an area where legal norms had largely ceased to matter. This 
recommendation, like many of the others included in the commission's re~ 
29. Amir & Navon, Politics of Abortion 50. 
30. See Dan Shnit, "Induced Abortion in Israeli Law," 15 Israeli Yearbook on Human 
Rights 155 (1985). 
31. A headline in the 31 Aug. 1962 edition of the Israeli paper Yediot Ahronot stated, 
"Doctors Who Perform Abortions Will Have to Go Underground, Can Expect Prosecutions 
and License Revocations." Cited in 4 Efrat 44 (1965). 
32. Salzberger et al., "Patterns of Contraceptive Behavior" at 12. 
33. Dov Friedlander, "Population Policy in Israel," in Bernard Berelson, ed., Population 
Policy in Developed Countries (New York: McGraw Hill, 1974). 
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port, was not implemented at the time. But the direction it outlined was the 
one ultimately followed when the Israeli abortion law was finally amended 
in 1977. 
B. Legislative Reform 
Those who sought legal reform out of a desire for greater abortion law 
enforcement were jOined in the early 1970s by the fledgling Israeli feminist 
movement and a short-lived political call for abortion rights. In the Knesset 
(the Israeli parliament) this call was largely the work of Marcia Freedman, a 
recent American immigrant and a newly elected legislator. Freedman sub-
mitted in 1974 a proposed bill for free abortion on demand and was instru-
mental in organizing feminist demonstrations on its behalf. Israeli women, 
for the most part, showed little interest in this legislative effort and were 
ambivalent about upsetting the status quo under which abortions, though 
illegal and often expensive, were widely available.34 The diverse political 
pressures for reform led to the appointment in 1972 of a new governmental 
committee for the study of the legal ban on abortions. The committee's 
report reviewed the legal, medical, social, and religious aspects of abortion 
policy and included a draft revision to the abortions statute.35 The primary 
model for the proposed bill was the 1967 British Abortion Act, which did 
not create a general right to abortion but outlined the conditions under 
which abortions will be exempted from criminal sanctions. Primary among 
these conditions was the good faith opinion of two registered medical prac-
titioners that continuance of the pregnancy would harm the physical or 
mental health of the woman or her children or that there is substantial risk 
that the child would be born with serious abnormalities. While the draft 
Israeli law produced by the committee was based on such partial legalization 
of abortion, its version differed from the British model in one significant 
respect. Whereas in Britain the concurrence of two medical practitioners 
was sufficient to legalize an abortion, the new Israeli bill allowed for greater 
bureaucratic control by conditioning legal abortions on the approval of hos-
pital committees. 
The draft abortion law was submitted to the Knesset in 1975 by 24 
legislators from both opposition and coalition parties. After a lengthy and 
acrimonious political debate, the law was approved in 1977 and went into 
effect in 1978.36 The law imposed a sanction of five-year imprisonment on 
the deliberate termination of pregnancy but exonerated from criminalliabil-
34. Lesley Hazleton, Israeli Women: The Reality behind the Myths (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1977). 
35. Committee Report, Briyut HatsibuT (cited in note 16). 
36. The law is codified as Penal Amendment (Interruption of Pregnancy) 1977,31 Laws 
of the State of Israel 82. 
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ity licensed gynecologists who performed the abortion in a recognized medi, 
cal institution after it was approved by a pregnancy termination committee. 
Such committees, to consist of two physicians and a registered social 
worker, were to operate in and under the supervision of recognized medical 
institutions. 
Committees were authorized to approve abortions under one of the 
following circumstances: (1) the woman is under marriage age (17) or over 
40; (2) the pregnancy resulted from relations prohibited by the criminal law, 
incestuous relations, or extramarital relations; (3) the child is likely to have 
a physical or mental defect; (4) continuance of the pregnancy is likely to 
endanger the woman's life or cause her physical or mental harm; (5) contin, 
uance of the pregnancy was likely to cause grave harm to the woman or the 
children owing to the difficult family or social circumstances of the woman 
and her environment. 
C. The Socioeconomic Conditions Clause 
The most controversial element in the new law was the provision, pat, 
temed after the British law and known as the social clause, that allowed 
committees to base abortion approvals on a woman's social environment 
and economic circumstances. The clause was directed at married women 
who did not fall under any of the other exemption categories. It was hotly 
contested in the debates of the abortion prohibitions committee, and its 
inclusion in the bill this committee ultimately produced proved to be cm, 
cial in gaining the support of women's groups who were ambivalent about 
the need and wisdom of legislative reform and the potential for stricter en, 
forcement against private abortion providers. 
The primary victims of the ambiguous legal status of abortions under 
the old Israeli law were women who could not afford abortions in the illegal 
but relatively safe37 private market and did not qualify for them under the 
limited medical categories recognized by the sick fund committees. Most 
women who came before these committees were of low socioeconomic 
background,38 and it was they who would gain the most from a broadening 
of recognized grounds for abortion. Looking back to her legislative efforts in 
this area, Ora Namir, an active proponent of the bill in the late 1970s and 
the current Minister of Labor and Welfare, stated: 
The abortion law was primarily enacted because of the social condi, 
tions provision. Well off women, including religious well off women, 
don't need laws, they know where to go and how to protect them' 
selves. We thought it was important, beyond the question of principle, 
37. See Salzberger et al .• "Patterns of Contraceptive Behavior" at 12. 
38. Committee Report. Briyut Hatsibur at 467. 
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in order to aid a population of women that have difficulty dealing with 
the conditions of their lives.39 
In sharp contrast to the situation in the United States where poor 
women's access to abortion was the primary casualty of the de facto com~ 
promises that have emerged in this area,40 Israeli abortion legislation offered 
the opposite trade~off. While the law imposed significant restrictions on the 
legality of abortions, it also held the promise of greater public funding for 
the procedure.41 In Israel such trade~offs are a natural extension of tradi~ 
tional commitments to collectivism and egalitarianism. Although pervasive 
gaps between ideology and practice have long characterized Israeli public 
life, these values remain central to the country's national ethos.42 The Is~ 
raeli abortion compromise clearly accords with such conceptions of interde~ 
pendence between individuals and their state. While it assumes the 
permeability of individual autonomy in this sphere, the legal model it posits 
is one in which the power to regulate abortions and the duty to provide for 
them are intertwined. 
A few months after the 1977 passage of the abortion law, in an unre~ 
lated political development, control of the government shifted from the 
long~ruling Labor Party to its Likud rival. Coalition negotiations between 
the Likud and its ultra~Orthodox partners resulted in a number of religious 
law concessions, primary among them the abolition of the "social conditions 
clause" from the list of circumstances justifying abortion approvals. Despite 
widespread opposition to this step,43 the clause was eliminated in 1980, in a 
55-50 vote, less than two years after it first came into effect. 
39. Protocols of Knesset debate on amendment 30 to the criminal code, 181st meeting 
of the 12th Knesset, 28 May 1990. 
40. Since 1977 Congress has severely restricted federal Medicaid funding for abortions in 
a series of amendments to congressional appropriations bills known as the "Hyde Amend-
ment." The Supreme Court upheld the Amendment in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980). The subject of public funding for abortion is currently again on the agenda in the 
context of President Clinton's plans for health care reform. 
41. Government-subsidized sick funds are the primary vehicle for public funding of abor-
tion under the current law. Such funding is available only when abortions are approved for a 
medical cause, i.e., fetal abnormalities or age of the pregnant woman or physical or emotional 
risk to her. When abortions are legally approved under other exemption categories, funding 
for needy women can sometimes be obtained from various public welfare organizations. The 
price for a hospital abortion is around $(US}350 (1,200 Israeli shekels). 
42. Shapiro Yonathan, Democracy in Israel (translated title) (Ramat-Gan: Masada, 1977) 
(in Hebrew). 
43. The social workers' union was among the most vocal opponents of the cancellation 
of the social clause which until then created a professional rationale for the presence of social 
workers in pregnancy termination commirtees. In an article focusing on the message of social 
equality implicit in the social clause, the then secretary general of the social workers union 
stated: "The pregnancy termination law is an important and essential social statute, whose 
cancellation, and especially the cancellation of the social clause provision in it, will constitute 
severe social injustice." Kadman Yitzhak, "Pregnancy Termination from a Social Perspective," 
3 Hevra Urvacha 320, 322 (1979) (in Hebrew). 
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The repeal of the social conditions clause undermined the primary ra~ 
tionale for liberal support of the new law, and was seen by these groups as a 
significant setback. To this day this legislative defeat retains important sym~ 
bolic meaning, and efforts to reintroduce the clause are occasionally under~ 
taken.+! However, as is often the case with legislated restrictions on 
abortion, the cancellation of the social clause had little impact on the 
number of abortion approvals which, after a temporary dip, soon returned to 
their preamendment leve1s.45 No longer able to justify an abortion by ex~ 
plicit reference to the number of children in a household or the economic 
conditions of the family, abortion committees invoked alternative exemp~ 
tion categories, most notably physical or mental risk.46 The result was a new 
ad hoc accommodation, in which formal limitations on justified abortions 
were complemented by an enforcement policy that responded to the needs 
of those who did not easily fit into the state~approved categories. The key to 
this accommodation was the flexibility and discretion the law accorded the 
abortion committees and the normative diversity this institutional auton~ 
omy has been able to support. 
D. Committee Discretion and Diversity 
As indicated before, abortion approval committees predated the pas~ 
sage of the 1977 law and were utilized in informal procedures. The 1977 law 
legitimated this model, expanded its definition, and accorded it a pivotal 
role in the mediation of the conflicting interests it sought to accommodate. 
44. The latest occurred in October 1993 when in an effort to take advantage of a rare 
absence of religious partners in the governing coalition, three bills proposing the reinstate-
ment of the social clause were brought before the Knesset. Proponents of this move presented 
it as an important first step toward broader elimination of aborrion restrictions and a bar 
against the proliferation of illegal abortions. Despite these goals, women's organizations did 
not mobilize on behalf of this effort. While this decision stemmed in part from recognition 
that the sensitive state of the peace process makes this a particularly inopportune time for 
actions that would undermine religious support of the government, it also reflected reluc~ 
tance, on the part of these groups, to expend political capital on a symbolic battle with few 
practical implications. The bills failed in a preliminary hearing when both major parties re~ 
fused to support them. See protocol of 37th meeting of the 13th Knesset, 20 Oct. 1993. 
45. According to Israeli governmental statistics, in 1979 there were 15,925 hospital 
abortions. In 1980, the year in which the social clause was eliminated, there was a 7.6% 
decline in the number of hospital abortions, which totaled 14,708. However, by 1982 the 
number of hospital abortions increased by 16% and reached 16,829, and in 1984 the number 
was 18,948. Whereas in 1979, 40% of hospital abortions were approved under the social 
clause and 8.2% were performed under the physical or psychological risk clause, in 1980, the 
year in which the social clause was eliminated, 35.1% of abortion approvals were granted 
under the medical risk clause. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics figures cited in Amir & 
Navon, Politics of Abortion 56 (cited in note 22). 
46. The latest detailed statistics of the distribution of committee approvals by clause are 
for 1989. During that year, of a total of 15,915 hospital abortions, 1,986 were justified by the 
woman's age, 6,715 were recorded as out-of-wedlock pregnancies, 3,022 were attributed to a 
malformed fetus, and 3,994 fell under danger to a woman's life. Approval clauses for an addi-
tional 198 abortions were not recorded. Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 42, sec. 3.23 (1991). 
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The pregnancy termination committees established by the law were granted 
wide discretion and little direction as to the values their decisions ought to 
serve. The Israeli law offers no rationale for the general prohibition it im~ 
poses and does not identify the claims it seeks to balance. There is no refer~ 
ence to the status of the fetus, its rights, or those of the pregnant woman. 
There are no statutory or administrative parameters for the severity of the 
risk to the fetus or pregnant woman that would justify an abortion and no 
definition of the nature of the mental harm the law envisioned. 
Finally, even for categories that appear to offer little room for in~ 
dependent judgment, such as unmarried relations or age, committees main~ 
tain discretionary authority. Under the law the "committee may ... approve 
the interruption of pregnancy if it considers it justified on one of the ... 
grounds." Thus satisfaction of one or more of the enumerated legal grounds 
allows but does not obligate a committee to approve an abortion. Although 
the reasonableness of committee decisions could probably be subject to judi~ 
cial review,47 petitions on this issue have not come before the Israeli High 
Court of Justice. The absence of such petitions should probably be attrib~ 
uted both to the general propensity of committees to approve abortions and 
to the legal capacity of women who were denied an abortion by one com~ 
mittee to bring their case before another.48 Here and in the interpretive 
responses of committees to the repeal of the social clause, the wide discre~ 
tion accorded under the law to the abortion committees has served to defuse 
what could have been significant abortion conflicts. 
Committees may operate in any hospital approved for this purpose by 
the Ministry of Health, and their membership is determined by hospital 
management. In 1991, 27 such committees operated in private and public 
hospitals throughout the country.49 Women may choose to apply to any 
committee in the country, and this choice may have important bearing on 
their chance for abortion approval. Despite uniform Ministry of Health reg~ 
ulations, studies of the procedures and policies employed by the committees 
show significant variation in the frequency at which committees are con~ 
vened, the amount of paperwork and bureaucratic red tape required of appli~ 
cants, and the tactics employed to discourage termination of pregnancy.50 
Committees also differ in the impact of the stage of the pregnancy on their 
approval policies, the strictness with which they interpret the presence of 
risk to the woman, and their willingness to approve abortions under the 
extramarital relations clause. 
47. Dan Shnit, 15 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights at 155, 158 (cited in note 30). 
48. The Court did consider a petition from a husband who contested a decision by a 
pregnancy termination committee to approve his wife's abortion. The husband's appeal was 
rejected on the ground that he did not have a vested right in the approval process. See C.A. 
(Civil Appeal) 413/80, Pionit v. Ploni, 35(3) P.D.57. Cited in id. at 175. 
49. Salzberger et al., "Patterns of Contraceptive Behavior" at 13 (cited in note 28). 
50. Id. at 13. 
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The lack of intercommittee consistency is the product both of the per~ 
sonal beliefs of senior doctors and administrators in each hospital and of the 
hospital's institutional affiliation and general worldview.51 Some Orthodox 
hospitals have refused to participate in the implementation of the 1977 law, 
did not establish committees, and do not perform abortions. Others approve 
and perform abortions only when continuation of the pregnancy would se~ 
verely endanger the health of the woman. In contrast, other hospitals and 
committees, particularly those operating in private hospitals in the Tel Aviv 
area, have developed a reputation for liberal abortion approval policies. Be~ 
cause a woman's chance for approval is highly dependent on the identity 
and ideological commitment of the committee she approaches, information 
on committee reputation is of crucial importance. Pregnancy counseling 
services are a primary mechanism for the dissemination of this knowledge, 
and they advise women as to which hospital committee is more likely to 
approve their request. Such counseling is particularly important in Jerusa~ 
lem where there is a high concentration of religious hospitals and few sym~ 
pathetic committees and where women are often unaware of the availability 
of accessible liberal committees in Tel Aviv, about 50 miles away.52 
Although women in Jerusalem and in small settlements and towns 
throughout the country are inconvenienced by the scarcity of approval 
committees in their locales, travel time to the nearest liberal pregnancy 
termination committee rarely exceeds more than two hours. Unlike the 
United States, where a delegation of the abortion question to the states 
would necessarily result in long journeys and severe hardships for many 
women, Israel's small size has mediated the effects of the normative diversity 
created under the committee structure. Institutional autonomy has allowed 
religious hospitals to form their own abortion policies and has isolated the 
government from direct accountability for some committees' liberal prac~ 
tices. While this arrangement and the diversity it supported have been the 
key to the relative calm of Israeli abortion politics, the long~term stability of 
this informal solution is less than clear. 
E. Governmental Control and Private Hospital Committees 
The wide variation in the approval policies of the different committees 
and the failure of the social clause repeal to reduce the number of abortions 
51. Memorandum from attorney Netta Ziv Goldman to the directors of the Israel Asso-
ciation of Civil Rights (ACRI), May 1987 (ACRI files). 
52. Of the five Jerusalem hospitals with obstetrics departments, two refuse to operate 
abortion approval committees and a third approves abortion only when continuation of the 
pregnancy poses significant risk to the mother. The remaining two hospitals, Hadassah Mt. 
Scopus and Hadassah Ein Karem, approve and perform abortions under all clauses of the law, 
but their approval process is long and cumbersome and the fees they charge are often higher 
than those charged by Tel Aviv hospitals. See Salzberger et al., "Patterns of Contraceptive 
Behavior" at 14. 
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resulted in intermittent political pressures during the 1980s for greater gov, 
ernmental control over committee decisions. Most of the attention was di, 
rected at the liberal abortion policies of six private hospitals in which, by 
1988, 66% of all approved abortions took place.53 The campaign against 
private hospital committees was originally initiated by a special advisor to 
the Minister of Health appointed under pressure from Agudat Israel, an ul, 
tra Orthodox religious party, to counteract what the party perceived as the 
overly liberal policies of the Ministry. His intervention resulted in the 1984 
appointment of yet another abortion committee, the Committee for Uni, 
formity in the Work of Committees for Termination of Pregnancy. Its report 
that year spoke of unspecified "problems" in the work of private hospital 
committees and recommended that all such committees be abolished be' 
cause of the financial incentives that might have influenced the approval 
decisions of private hospitals. 54 
The Committee for Uniformity's recommendation was transformed in 
1987 into a draft bill that sought to abolish private hospital committees. 
The bill remained dormant for three years and resurfaced in 1989 in aver, 
sion that promised governmental control over the authorization of all abor, 
tion,approving institutions by linking the licensing of committees in 
nongovernmental hospitals to the specific approval of the Ministry of 
Health.55 The. proposed amendment was published in August 1989 and 
passed the first of three required readings in May 1990. Neither event 
aroused significant public interest, and both major parties, Likud and Labor, 
seemed willing to support the amendment, which, together with a set of 
other religiously inspired legislative proposals, became central to coalition 
negotiations. 
Counter,mobilization efforts began in the spring of 1990 with the crea, 
tion of a coalition of 15 women's and civil rights groups. The coalition 
initially focused its efforts on lobbying activities directed at both Likud and 
Labor Knesset members. It organized a public information campaign after 
Agudat Israel joined the government and pressures for final passage of the 
53. Many of the abortions performed in private hospitals were, however, approved by 
government hospital abortion committees. Thus in 1988 private hospitals approved a total of 
5,352 but performed 10,048 of the total of 15,255 legal abortions performed during that year. 
In 1989 there were 5,166 private hospital approval and 7,769 actual private hospital abortions 
out of a total of 15,216 legal abortions. Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 42, sec. 3.25 (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 1991). 
54. Report of the Committee for Uniform Procedures in the Work of Committees for the 
Termination of Pregnancy, Letter from Prof. Yitzhak Shankar, committee chair, to Eliezer 
Shostak, Minister of Justice, 4 April 1984 (in Hebrew, ACRI files). Political efforts to amend 
the law and restrict abortions to hospitals designated by the Ministry of Health were attrib-
uted by an attorney for the Association for Civil Rights in Israel to a steady increase in the 
proportion of private hospital abortions during the 1980s. Neta Ziv Goldman, "Abortions at 
the Grace of the Coalition" (translated title), Ha'aretz, 11 June 1990, p. 4 (in Hebrew). 
55. Draft Amendment No. 30 to the Criminal Code, 21 Aug. 1989. 
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bill appeared imminent.56 Significantly, the campaign was billed as a strug, 
gle for reproductive health rather than reproductive rights and emphasized 
the potential medical risks of reductions in the number and accessibility of 
committees. The medical focus was a result of an explicit tactical decision 
to appeal to the greatest social consensus and to avoid what might have 
become a confrontational emphasis on abortion rights and the dangers of 
governmental monopoly over abortion services. The threat of such a mo, 
nopoly was, however, the motivating factor behind the coalition's efforts 
and the reason it rejected a compromise proposal, brokered by a governmen, 
tal advisor on women affairs, which would have increased the number of 
committees in public hospitals in compensation for the committees lost in 
the private sector. The coalition's own compromise proposal called for the 
substitution of private committees with committees based in the hospitals 
and clinics of the various sick funds. 
The coalition's clear preference for nonconfrontational strategies and 
political compromise was the product of both internal divisions among coa, 
lition members and recognition of the limited public support for their cause. 
Financial support for the coalition largely came from two progressive Amer, 
ican Zionist foundations.57 American Jewish groups also supported the coa, 
lition's efforts through a joint message signed by 12 religious and women's 
organizations. The communique, published in December 1990, urged Israeli 
leaders "not to risk women's lives in the interest of political expediency." In 
contrast to the conciliatory language and medical emphasis of the Israeli 
coalition's pamphlet, the American message spoke of "a woman's right to 
safe legal abortion" and referred to the proposed amendment as a threat to a 
"woman's right to privacy and confidentiality in making this most personal 
decision. "58 
The coalition never had an opportunity to test its political strength. 
Before the amendment was put before the Knesset for final passage, the tide 
of Israeli politics shifted and the ultra Orthodox pressure waned. The 
amendment was tabled and the coalition, aware that its goal might not yet 
be achieved, suspended its activities. Private hospital committees continue 
to operate in the country, and committee diversity remains a crucial ele' 
ment in Israeli abortion practice. In addition, no enforcement efforts have 
been directed against the thousands of private, illegal abortions performed 
annually. While calls for stricter enforcement occasionally surface, primarily 
in response to media reports of medical malpractice, the police have been 
56. Memo from Neta Ziv-Goldman (ACRl) to SHATIL, 6 Dec. 1990 (ACRl files). 
57. The two foundations are the New Israel Fund and the Bronfman Fund. Fiscal report 
of the abortions coalition, 12 Dec. 1990 (ACRI files). It is significant that many of the con-
stituent organizations of the coalition are themselves beneficiaries of the New Israel Fund, a 
liberal American Zionist fund which supports progressive social causes in Israel. 
58. Joint communique regarding the proposed amendment to the abortions law, 24 Dec. 
1990 (ACRl files). 
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under little pressure to revise their hands-off policy in this area. As is often 
the case in this policy arena,59 legal norms continue to be marginal to the de 
facto arrangements guiding Israeli abortion compromises. 
IV. FACADES, IMAGES, AND THE TERMS OF 
COMPROMISE 
The Israeli abortion compromise is the product of distinct separation 
between official messages and actual practices. The extralegal and informal 
nature of abortion policies in Israel is a constituent element in the implicit 
bargain governing this area. Ad hoc liberal abortion policies have always 
been accompanied in Israel by legal restrictions and public rhetoric that 
portrayed abortions as illegal, dangerous, and contrary to the religious values 
and demographic interests of the country. Supporters of legal access to abor-
tion generally avoid public and media attention and rarely try to interfere 
with the abortion picture its opponents create. They shirk ideological con-
frontations and make little effort to initiate legal and political change in the 
abortion sphere.60 Perhaps even more important, few efforts are directed 
toward providing women with information regarding their rights under the 
law and their options for navigating the committee systems. While preg-
nancy counseling centers in most major cities aid in the dissemination of 
such information, women who lack access to such centers often choose pri-
vate, and potentially less safe, abortions out of the misconception that legal 
abortions are difficult to obtain. 
This passivity appears to be rooted in concern over the delicate bal-
ance that currently supports practical accommodations on abortion, as well 
as the place of a facade of legal and political restrictions in the prevention 
.of direct conflicts between secular and religious law. Because abortion prac-
tice is always hidden from the public eye, it is less likely to result in the 
open confrontations that more visible religious affronts have triggered in 
Israel. Protection of this facade appears to have been a prominent factor in 
the reluctance of abortion service providers and supporters to draw atten-
tion to the reality of abortion practice in the country. Recognizing that such 
attention is more likely to harm than aid their cause, women's and civil 
rights groups have entered the abortion debate only in response to explicit 
threats to the status quo, such as the proposed amendment to the law dis-
cussed above. Otherwise, abortion policies appear to be shrouded in an air 
of secrecy aimed at preserving the gap between image and reality.61 
This approach has, for the most part, successfully deflected greater reli-
gious pressure for abortion restrictions. Legislative gains such as the aboli-
59. See, e.g., Stanley K. Henshaw, "Induced Abortion: A Worldwide Perspective," 18 
Family Planning Perspectives 250 (1986). 
60. Amir & Navon, Politics of Abortion 76-77 (cited in note 22). 
61. Id. at 73. 
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tion of the social clause prOViSion provided Orthodox parties with 
symbolical political victories and eased rabbinical demands to make abor~ 
tion a central element in their political agenda. The abolition of the clause 
that allowed abortions for reasons unrelated to the health of the woman or 
fetus also brought the law closer to Jewish religious norms. Finally, in light 
of the fact that Orthodox women do procure abortions, a push for actual as 
opposed to formal limitations on abortion could be controversial among the 
religious parties' own constituencies.62 
For these and perhaps other reasons, abortion opponents have stuck to 
their side of the implicit bargain and have refrained from escalating the 
conflict through direct targeting of abortion patients or providers.63 In sharp 
contrast to the prevalence of personal violence in the American abortion 
scene, the Israeli opposition has restricted its activities to the level of public 
demonstrations and legislative maneuvers. 
Israeli women seem to have, for the most part, benefited from the 
terms of the Israeli abortion compromise. While some women appear to lack 
information about their rights and options, most have learned to navigate 
through the system. Resentment of the committee process is tempered with 
appreciation of the funding offered for many approved abortions, and a 
largely safe private abortion market provides an alternative for those who 
out of ignorance or choice avoid hospital procedures. Although local abor~ 
tion availability problems exist in some places, most notably Jerusalem, the 
small scale of the country diminishes the significance of this problem. 
While abortion choices are subject to legal controls, governmental restric~ 
tions are significantly less burdensome than the alternatives religious and 
demographic concerns could have instituted. Awareness of the threat of 
such alternatives has led abortion services activists to cling to the precarious 
and imperfect balance they have achieved and to avoid actions that might 
jeopardize the status quo. 
Fear of rocking the boat and recognition of the centrality of percep~ 
tions to the quiescence of the abortion scene have stifled public debate on 
the issue. Although this tactic has generally succeeded in removing abortion 
policies from the main stage of Israeli politics, it has significantly limited the 
capacity of abortion activists to respond to negative political developments. 
Because the public arena has largely been abandoned to the opposition, 
there is little basis for grass~roots support and few options for political mo~ 
bilization. When the need for such mobilization has arisen, as in the case of 
62. Salzberger et al., "Patterns of Contraceptive Behavior" at 31 (cited in note 28) re-
port that in a sample of Jewish women who applied for pregnancy counseling in Jerusalem, 
10% identified themselves as Orthodox or ultra Orthodox and 38.7% identified as traditional. 
63. The director of Shilo, a Jerusalem pregnancy counseling center, stated that although 
her office has received publications from Efrat, the major abortion opposition group in the 
country, it has never been the target of harassment or demonstrations. Interview with Joanne 
Zack-Pakes, 23 Jan. 1993. 
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the proposed amendment to the law, the lack of public awareness and in, 
volvement was a significant obstacle. The call issued by opponents of the 
proposed elimination of private hospital committees for support from liberal 
Jewish American groups is indicative of the degree to which the issue re, 
mains outside the mainstream of Israeli concerns. Under the implicit terms 
of the Israeli abortion compromise this situation is unlikely to change soon. 
In the absence of an internal Israeli debate on abortion, activists on 
both sides of the issue have taken their cues from American conceptions of 
this dispute. This process has been greatly facilitated by the disproportionate 
presence of American immigrants among the staff and leadership of organi, 
zations active in this area. As indicated earlier, feminists from the United 
States were instrumental during the 1970s in the initiation of abortion legis, 
lative reforms, and Orthodox American immigrants during the 1980s have 
been responsible for political pressures for abortion restrictions. Pregnancy 
counseling centers with opposing orientations are run by American expatri, 
ots, and financial support for most abortion,related organizations comes, at 
least in part, from American Jewish sources. The result is an abortion arena 
that is both overshadowed by, and infused with, the passions of U.S. abor, 
tion struggles.64 
The dependence of Israeli abortion activism on the ideological suste, 
nance provided by the American model is significant for two distinct rea' 
sons. Because key players in Israel derive their commitments from American 
visions of the abortion controversy, American images of the dispute 
threaten to destabilize Israeli abortion policies. While thus far the American 
abortion experience seems to have inspired more caution than extremism in 
Israel, its divisions have begun to define the range of normative alternatives 
to current compromises. 
But if the undercurrent of American influence can explain why, de' 
spite the general indifference of Israelis, abortion solutions remain precari, 
ous, it also underscores the distance of abortion policy issues from the core 
concerns of most Israelis. Because the Israeli abortion debate is largely an 
imported controversy with little local resonance, the compromises it engen, 
dered have been forged over much narrower splits than the normative divi, 
sions American abortion compromises would need to bridge. Recognition of 
this difference should alert us both to the social contingency of the Ameri, 
can focus on abortion as a uniquely tragic dilemma and to the implications 
64. Israeli abortion activists are deeply cognizant of the potential impact of develop-
ments in the American abortion sphere on the evolution of Israeli abortion politics. Following 
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Webster II. Reproductive Health Services, the secretary-
general ofNa'amat, the women's arm of the Histadrut, Israel's mega trade union, voiced con-
cern over the potential impact of the decision on anti-abortion forces in Israel. In a letter 
addressed to labor zionist organizations in the United States, the secretary-general encouraged 
these groups to "add their political muscle" to the American pro-choice struggle. Judy Siegel, 
''Na'amat Fears Israeli Fallout from U.S. Ruling on Abortion," Jerusalem Post, 6 July 1989, p. 
2. 
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of this distinction for cross-national adoption of legislative compromises in 
this area. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The divergent paths of abortion politics in Israel and the United States 
reflect important differences in underlying religious doctrines, geographical 
size, and feminist ideologies, as well as the immediacy of other social cleav-
ages in the two countries. But perhaps more profoundly, the two abortion 
stories are the product of distinct understandings of the mutual obligations 
between citizens and their state and of the relationship between individual 
and collective rights and duties. These differences are reflected by activists 
on both sides of the abortion issue in the two countries. Israeli and Ameri-
can supporters of abortion rights made opposite trade-offs between abortion 
funding and regulation, while abortion opponents focused on divergent 
claims: fetal rights in the American case, and demography and collective 
identity in the Israeli case. Though the diffusion of American ideology has 
had some superficial impact on the rhetorical stands of both sides in Israel, 
it has not altered the distinct starting points of abortion controversies in the 
two countries. 
In contrast to the United States, where the abortion dispute has been 
played out against a wall of separation between church and state, the Israeli 
abortion story is a chapter in a much larger debate over the meaning of the 
state's Jewish identity. Abortion is a singular dilemma for Americans be-
cause the normative questions it raises directly challenge prevailing liberal 
commitments to the moral neutrality of the state. Unlike Americans, Israe-
lis live within a political system in which the state maintains an intimate 
presence in the life of its citizens and collective formulations of identity and 
norms are defining features of public discourse. Thus, unlike the United 
States where abortion invokes dormant fundamental divisions, in Israel it is 
politics as usua1.65 Such normalcy means both a distinct preference for am-
biguity and the subordination of religious conflicts to the increasingly ur-
gent debate over the future of the occupied territories. As gradual pressures 
for Israeli constitutional reform converge with fragile signs of peace and 
hopes for drastic realignment of political priorities, long-postponed debates 
about the boundaries between private and public domains are likely to 
emerge. It remains to be seen whether a more contentious abortion scene 
would be one of the manifestations of this evolving social context and grow-
ing Israeli concern with the trade-offs between community consensus and 
the right to be left alone. 
65. The "politics as usual" baseline is derived from Kim Lane Scheppele. "Abortion and 
the Breakdown of Politics-as-Usual" (presented at Law & Society Association annual meet-
ing. Philadelphia. 1992). 
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